remains dependent upon his environment, he also reacts to it and tries to shape it nearer to his heart's desire. From the viewpoint of all science, man's liberty is not so much his freedom from drive and desire, from determination and motivation, but rather his power to act and to create, to preserve and to change. In other words, man's freedom is not freedom from..., but freedom to...

Since human actions and omissions are part and parcel of the unfolding of the future, their predictability is, as has been intimated, subject to considerable variation. Futurology simply tries to discover the degree of credibility or probability with which future developments, including group behavior, will occur. A prediction deals as a rule with more or less probable outcomes so as to leave a range of choice. Whether the individual will identify himself with the most probable course or whether he will throw his weight behind the least likely one, will depend on his standards and values. Only the outright opportunist or "realist" will always decide in favor of the most likely development. The man of principle, the "idealist," on the other hand, might sometimes have to choose the less or even the least probable alternative in order to contribute his share to the realization of his ideals.

A historical example may serve to clarify these possible attitudes. In 1940, after the fall of France, Laval decided to collaborate with the Nazis, while de Gaulle went to London to continue the fight against Hitler. Let us imagine that a scientific exploration of the future had convinced both that the Third Reich had a greater chance to win than Britain. Conceivably their choice might have remained the same. Laval as the "realist" might have felt it advisable to march with the bigger battalions, while de Gaulle might have felt it his duty to accept a greater risk for the sake of an overpowering ideal. Chamberlain's appeasement policy in 1938/39, on the other hand, resulted from a complete misreading of the future. Had he correctly gauged the forthcoming policies of the dictators, he could not very well have expected to secure peace in his time through appeasement. In none of these three cases would an acquaintance with Futurology have eliminated the element of personal choice. Laval and de Gaulle would have scarcely been affected by correct prognosis, while Chamberlain might well have arrived at a more enlightened and adequate decision.

Perhaps we may conclude that a study of the future, if properly conducted, should reaffirm the significance of human endeavor and, by redefining the area of choices, should enable man to act more intelligently and purposefully.