development of human personality and insistence on the universality of these standards... Realist Liberalism... would serve as basis for political action with attainable goals." The latter is "less glamorous than common Political Idealism," but "also less utopian; less emotional, but also more sober." It is supposedly less subject to disappointment and refutation.

Herz' book suggests several questions: First, we may ask, is Realist Liberalism quite as new and untried as the author seems to believe? Has it not been the more or less conscious policy of quite a few moderate middle-of-the-road reformers such as the Fabians or the revisionists with their "modest dreams and practicable aspirations" (E.F.M. Durbin)? Second, should the practicable or the possible really be the highest criterion for political action? Is there not much truth in Max Weber's suggestion that "man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible" especially if such idealism is coupled with a clear realization of the boundaries of the possible and the impossible? Moreover, does it not depend on a given historic situation which of the three positions is likely to be successful, and is it, therefore, "realistic" to value one so highly? Third, on his last page, Herz himself concedes that "the age-old security dilemma has so largely been based upon scarcity of goods and ensuing competition for and inequality in the satisfaction of basic wants" and that atomic energy and other discoveries may produce "the definite solution of the age-old security dilemma." "With the achievement of material abundance... a major obstacle in the way of the solution of the vicious circle of power and security competition would have disappeared." Assuming, however, that there is such a thing as a solution of the power and security dilemma in, let us say, the Third Millenium A.D., does not that bare possibility call for a different evaluation of both Political Idealism and Political Realism? Would not then the former appear much more realistic in its basic assumptions and utopian only insofar as it lacks a proper time perspective? By the same token, would not Political Realism lose much of its "realism" since, instead of interpreting a basic "condition humaine" it would then merely hypostasize a temporary historic situation?

Let us hope that, in a subsequent volume, the author will answer such questions as these in an equally inspiring way.