when amplified by his elaborate and kaleidoscopic qualifications. More often than not he thus produces findings that are truly concrete in that they show no traces of either dogmatism or vagueness. Since the present volume is mainly devoted to the exposition of his methodology, it does not bring out the virtues of his work as clearly as, for instance, Gerth and Mill's selections entitled From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology have done. Nevertheless Henderson and Parsons have earned our gratitude for their able translation of these introductory chapters of Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, and it is hoped that they will make available to the American reader the remainder of this great work at an early date.

BERTRAND RUSSELL: Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Simon and Schuster, New York, 524 pp. $ 5,--.

Bertrand Russell's "philosophical testament" which has received much well-deserved praise, suffers nevertheless from a strange discrepancy between the all-inclusiveness of its title and sub-title on the one hand, and the "epistemological exclusiveness" of its content on the other. For, in examining "the relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge", the famous author deals with two types of knowledge only, namely the knowledge of the so-called common sense and the knowledge supplied by logic and natural sciences. Furthermore, the discussion is limited to the investigation of the logical, linguistic, practical, etc. - in short, the epistemological reasons for the validity or non-validity of these types of knowledge. Since the tree of epistemological knowledge bears only scanty fruit in the very nature of things, the reader should not be surprised to find the conclusions of the detailed study less rewarding than he may have expected.

These can be summarized as follows. Both solipsism and scepticism are rejected as "psychologically impossible". While Russell admits "that data are private and individual", he denies the conclusion that all knowledge is private and individual. "All particular facts that are known without inference are known by perception or memory, that is to say, through experience." "Inferences", "causal principles", "postulates", however, are neither logically necessary nor known by experience. Their assumption leads "to results which are in conformity with experience, but this fact does not logically suffice to make the principles even probable." "Our knowledge of them cannot be based upon experience, though all their verifiable consequences are such as experience will confirm." "The principles are 'known' in a different sense from that in which particular facts are known." "'Knowledge'... is a much less precise concept than is generally thought, and has its roots more deeply in unverbalized animal behavior than most philosophers have been willing to admit." As "part of the adaptation to the environment upon which biological survival depends", mankind have formed "inferential habits which lead to true expectations". "As mankind have advanced in intelligence, their inferential habits have come gradually near-