widely from a purely empirical description of phenomena in terms of cause and effect, found so frequently in American studies in sociology. Giving instead a transcendental interpretation, it is, in a way, an attempt to locate man cosmically in history. This has become quite clear half a century after the death of Marx and Engels.

Marx always was as much and perhaps even more than Hegel the philosopher of the "Objective Mind" - to use Hegel's terminology. Man as a social and historical entity is the basis of his peculiar form of humanism. Though the existence of nature is not denied, it takes its place in the shadowy realm of semi-reality. It is conceived of primarily as a field of activity for man, as the material of his socio-historical practice, as an integral part of the life-process of mankind which is, in essence, history.

Marx's concept of reality does not suggest the realm of Hegel's abstract, speculative, and spiritualistic categories. However, it has little in common with the empirical data of a positivistically inclined social science. Nor can it be reduced to the realistically interpreted data of classical natural science. Certainly it can not be reduced to "matter" as interpreted in the sense of 19th-century natural materialism. To Marx all these are nothing but "ideologies" which mirror and transfigure the every-day "common sense" of a bourgeois mentality.

Marx's "materialism" was of a rather peculiar nature. An understanding of his "historical" materialism or "materialist dialectics" requires an investigation into the relationship of history to society on the one hand, and to nature on the other. One has to keep in mind that "nature" has in Marx's system at least two different meanings or functions. First we are faced with an abstraction that may be identified as "nature as such" apart from the history of man and society. True, Marx as the systematic theorist and the practical politician was never much interested in nature as such; the development of this theme was left to Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin. Nevertheless nature in this sense does appear occasionally in Marx's own writings, and it is continually present as a background to his system. This nature is the ultimate "basis"[41] of all productive and social relations[41]. It is indeed seen by Marx in terms very similar to the materialism of the traditional variety. In sharp contrast to Hegel, for whom the entire universe - nature as well as society and mind - was nothing but the one continuous process of the "Absolute Mind" that grows more and more self-conscious and free, Marx suggested that nature was essentially a sum-total of events and their causes which man may at best explain and influence, but never completely control and master. Nature so seen is infinite, abundant in its opposition

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41) Marx, Capital, ed. Untermann, Volume III, Chicago 1909, pp.955.