er to agreement with the laws of nature which have made these habits, throughout, more often a source of true expectations than of false ones." Empiricism, then, "as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate, though less so than any other previous theory of knowledge. Indeed, such inadequacies as we have seemed to find in empiricism have been discovered by strict adherence to a doctrine by which empiricist philosophy has been inspired: that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever."

As far as these conclusions go, this reviewer is neither able nor inclined to quarrel with them. Indeed, Lord Russell's theory of knowledge seems much more satisfactory to him than those of other more extreme schools such as the idealistic or rationalistic school on the one hand and the purely materialistic or pragmatic on the other. Still one wonders whether, first, the lengthy logical and mathematical arguments were all indispensable to reach these conclusions, and, second, whether so great a mental effort might not have been spent more fruitfully on the investigation of the historical, sociological, and psychological bases and meanings of all types of human knowledge. As to the first point, it could be argued that in things philosophical the investigation itself is at least as important as any conclusion that may be reached. Moreover, the main road and most of the side-roads along which Russell leads the patient reader, make pleasant walking indeed. Surely, many of the 500 pages of the volume exhibit not only the author's proverbial brilliance and lucidity, but also a humane urbanity and expert competence which will not fail to endear him to even those readers who having long since forgotten their college mathematics are unable to understand the numerous pages of awe-inspiring symbols and deductions.

The second objection is more serious and it will not do to explain that, by limiting himself to pure epistemology, the British philosopher is merely living up to the great tradition of a Descartes, Locke, or Hume. For since the eighteenth century the knowledge contained in the so-called social sciences has expanded considerably bringing with it an increasing awareness of the socio-cultural unity and the historical roots of all branches of knowledge. Hume himself devoted much attention to the difference between logical and inductive reasoning of empirical science on the one hand, and the use of reason in the realm of ethics and morals on the other. And of Kant's famous three cardinal contributions, only one does not go beyond the critique of scientific judgments whereas the other two refer to moral and esthetic knowledge. Finally, Hegel, who in his *Phenomenology of the Mind* anticipated Russell's interpretation of ostensive definition and proper names, wrestles not only with the problems of common sense and scientific knowledge, but with the whole range of human experiences - from sense perception to philosophical imagination and intuition. While Hegel's approach is sadly ambiguous and dogmatic, he at least raised the question of the place of the various kinds of knowledge in the whole of nature, culture, and history. Compared with Hegel, not to mention later thinkers, Russell makes disconcertingly few and scanty references to the specific problems of knowledge of